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Mendelson: People v Mercado

DOUBLE JEOPARDY
US. CoNST. amend V:
No person shall be... subjectfor the same offence
to be twice put injeopardy of life or limb ....
N.Y CoNsT. art. , § 6:

jeopardy

No person shall be subject to be twice put in
for
the
same
offense

SUPREME COURT
BRONX COUNTY

People v. Mercado'
(Decided July 6, 1999)
Defendant, Anthony Mercado was charged with several crimes:
intentional murder in the second degree, manslaughter in the first
degree, reckless endangerment in the first degree, endangering the
welfare of a child, criminal use of a firearm in the first degree,
criminal possession of a weapon in the second and third degrees
and manslaughter in the second degree.
The jury acquitted
Mercado of the murder charge and manslaughter in the first
degree.' At the close of its case, the People dismissed the charges
pertaining to reckless endangerment, endangering the welfare of a
child and the criminal use of a firearm, criminal possession of a
weapon and the jury was unable to return a verdict on the final
charge of manslaughter in the second degree.4
After the verdict from the first trial was rendered, the
prosecution presented the matter to a grand jury who immediately

1 695 N.Y.S.2d 676 (1999).
2 id

3id.
4Id
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returned a second indictment.' In the instant action the indictment
charged the defendant with murder in the second degree under a
different subsection of Penal Law 125, and charged the defendant
with depraved indifference to murder.6
Anthony Mercado seeks a dismissal based on a claim that both
his New York State Constitutional7 as well as his Federal
Constitutional Rights' have been violated under the Double
Jeopardy Clause. The 5d' Amendment to the Constitution in
defining the Double Jeopardy Clause states, "Nor shall any person
be subject for the same offence to be put twice in jeopardy of life
or limb.. . . "' New York State's Constitution has followed the
example set by the Federal Constitution and has adopted a Double
Jeopardy Clause into its Constitution, "[n]o person shall be subject
to be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense .... "a Although
the court acknowledged the importance of the Double Jeopardy
Clause, it recognized that it could not end its evaluation of
depraved indifference to murder and intentional murder in the
second degree based upon the federal guidelines. The court chose
to focus its attention on New York Criminal Procedure Law
section 40.20 which sets guidelines for barring a second
prosecution.12 In this case, the application of section 40.20 is what
guides the court's reasoning.

5 Mercado at 678.

Id. In the first action the defendant was charged with violating Penal Law
Section 125.10 which describes murder in the first degree. In the instant
indictment the defendant was charged with violating Penal Law Section 125.20.
This section defines manslaughter in the first degree.
7 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6 which states in pertinent part: "[n]o person shall be
subject to be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense .... "
' U.S. CONST. amend. V which states in pertinent part: "[n]or shall any person
be subject for the same offence to be put twice in jeopardy of life or limb .... "
' N.Y. CONST amend. V.
10 Mercado,695 N.Y.S.2d at 678.
" N.Y. CGIM. PROC. LAW § 40.20 (McKinney 1999). Section 2 (b) provides:
"Each of the offenses as defined contains an element which is not an element of
the other, and the statutory provisions defining such offenses are designed to
prevent very different kinds of harm or evil." Id
6

12

Id
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In People v. Mercado, the defendant appeals the charge of
depraved indifference murder in the second degree based on his
belief that it violates his Constitutional right of not being put in
double jeopardy for the same offense.13 He claims that trying him
for depraved indifference to murder in the second degree after his
previous acquittal of intentional murder in the second degree
violates the Double Jeopardy Clause because depraved
indifference is a lesser charge than intentional murder in the
second degree. 4 The court found for the defendant and dismissed
his charge of depraved indifference stating, "[t]he crime of
intentional murder charged in the first indictment and the crime of
depraved indifference murder charged in the second indictment
,5
unquestionably arise out of the same criminal transaction..
In this instance, both indictments arise out of a common act.
Under the United Sates Constitution, in order for the Double
Jeopardy clause to apply, the charges must contain the same
requisite mental states but the same is not true under the New York
Constitution. The court acknowledged that if just deciding this
issue solely on Constitutional grounds, the court would have
upheld the second prosecution of Mercado because the charges
6
require separate mental states.'
In its analysis, the court first analyzed the double jeopardy claim
made by Mercado, and looked to a decision of the Second Circuit
for guidance. In Knapp v. Leonardo, the defendant was charged
with two counts of murder in the second degree and one count of
intentional murder. 7 At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found
Knapp guilty of reckless murder and acquitted him of intentional
murder.18 On appeal, the decision was reversed and remanded and
at the second trial the defendant was charged with reckless murder
but convicted of the lesser offense of second degree
manslaughter. 9 Knapp again appealed and claimed his conviction
13 Mercado, 695

N.Y.S.2d at 677.
Id.
IsId.at 681.
16 Id
17 Knapp v. Leonardo,46 F.3d 170, 173 (2d Cir. 1995).
I8
Id. at 174.
19Id. at 175.

14
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violated the Double Jeopardy Clause but the court concluded,
"[t]he Double Jeopardy Clause is not violated as long as the two
prosecutions of Knapp each required proof of an element which the
other prosecution did not require proof."2
The Mercado court's analysis of the Double Jeopardy Clause
relied on the reasoning set forth in Knapp. Where the court stated,
"[b]ecause the mental states of these crimes differ, no double
jeopardy violation resulted from defendant's retrial .... [e]ven
though there was an 'overlap of proof between the first trial and
retrial.",2 ' The instant case is similar to Knapp because the Second
Circuit was forced to decide whether intentional murder and
reckless murder constituted the same offense in order to determine
if the Double Jeopardy Clause should apply.22 If the court were to
have construed the Double Jeopardy Clause in its narrow sense,
namely "the same offense in fact and in law,"' then the court
would have found for the prosecution because depraved
indifference to murder and intentional murder are not the same
crime if read literally. Each crime possesses different underlying
mental states. If the court had ended its inquiry here, the second
prosecution would not have been prohibited under the United
States Constitution.
The court analyzed the two indictments based upon §40.20 to
determine whether the prosecution of depraved indifference to
murder should be barred. The court looked to the intent of the
legislature when enacting Criminal Procedure Law §40.20.24 It
appears that the New York State legislature was unhappy with the
application and broad interpretation of the federal Double Jeopardy
Clause so they codified their broader interpretation in §40.20.5 In
doing so, the federal government's interpretation has been

20
21

Id.at 178.
Mercado, 695 N.Y.S.2d at 679.

2Id.

People v. Bokun, 145 Misc. 2d 860, 863, 548 N.Y.S. 2d 604, 606 (1989).
Mercado, 695 N.Y.S.2d at 679.
25 Abraham v. New York, 37 N. Y. 2d 560, 565, 338 N.E.2d 597, 600 (1975).
See also Mercado, 695 N.Y.S. 2d at 679.
23
24
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extended and in its broadest sense applies to "offenses not
identical but included within each other."' 7
The application of §40.20 differs from that of the Article V of
the United States Constitution and Article I section 6 of the New
York Constitution. In its analysis of the two indictments, the
Mercado court focused its attention on the broad, underlying facts
of depraved indifference to murder and to murder in the second
degree. The court recognized that even though the two offenses are
based upon the same criminal activity, the prosecution of the
second offense was not automatically barred.' The court focused
its attention on the exceptions noted in §40.20(2).29 Section
40.20(2)(a) provides, "the offenses as defined have substantially
different elements and the acts establishing one offense are in the
main clearly distinguishable from those establishing the other."
In the instant case, the two criminal charges operate out of a
common nucleus of acts. The People do not agree, claiming that it
was the defendant's testimony at the first trial, which gave rise to
the second indictment. This argument is rejected by the court as
having no factual basis because the second grand jury relied on
substantially the same evidence as the first grand jury." The court
therefore in its decision held for Mercado and dismissed the
depraved indifference to murder charge.3"
The separate interpretation by the federal government of the
Double Jeopardy Clause in contrast to the interpretation by the
New York State legislature produces significantly different results.
In the instant case the defendant's second indictment of depraved
indifference to murder was dismissed after the court applied
§40.20. If however the Federal Constitutional standard were
applied, the defendant would have been prosecuted. The Double
People v. Abbamonte, 43 N.Y. 2d 74, 81-82, 371 N.E.2d 485, 488 (1977).
See also People v. Bokun, 145 Misc. 2d 860, 863, 548 N.Y.S.2d 604, 606
26

(1989).
Boku, 145 Misc. 2d at 863, 548 N.Y.2d at 606.
28 Mercado,695 N.Y.S.2d at 679.
27

29 Id

30
31

N.Y. CRiM. PROC. LAW § 40.20 (McKinney 1999).
Mercado,695 N.Y.S.2d at 679.

32Id.
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Jeopardy Clause provides a limited room for interpretation of
"same offense" while the New York Criminal Procedure Law has
in §40.20 expanded the meaning of double jeopardy that results in
a broader application.
While the New York Constitution examines the elements of the
two crimes to determine whether a prosecution is barred under
double jeopardy, the United States Constitution will only bar a
prosecution for double jeopardy if the two crimes are literally the
same. The New York legislature's interpretation of the Double
Jeopardy Clause, therefore, "provides a far more comprehensive
protection against separate prosecutions for 'two offenses based
33
upon the same act or criminal transaction.'
Robyn Mendelson

33

id.
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